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I. Introduction
he Federal Reserve requires U.S. commercial banks and 
other depository institutions to hold a minimum level of 
reserves in proportion to certain liabilities. On occasion, the 
central bank has reduced reserve requirements—such as in 
1990, when requirements on large time deposits were dropped, 
and in 1992, when requirements on transaction accounts were 
reduced. In addition, more and more banks since 1994 have 
used computer technologies that temporarily “sweep” deposits 
from one type of account to another, thereby reducing required 
reserve levels. 
To provide customers with payments-related services, 
banks hold assets in two forms that also qualify as reserves: 
vault cash and balances deposited in Federal Reserve accounts. 
Such assets earn no interest when they meet reserve 
requirements, and traditionally the requirements have led 
banks to hold greater amounts of these nonearning assets than 
were optimal for business purposes. Reserve requirement 
reductions and deposit sweeping have allowed banks to lower 
such incremental costs.1
After the elimination of reserve requirements on 
nonpersonal time deposits and eurocurrency liabilities in 1990, 
the federal funds market experienced a significant surge in 
volatility. This occurrence, coupled with the growth in retail 
sweeps in the late 1990s, has raised concerns that the continued 
decline in reserve balances would again destabilize the federal 
funds rate, thereby increasing the financing costs of borrowing 
banks and dealers. Despite the sharp drop in reserve balances, 
however, the effect on the overnight markets has been 
negligible, because at the same time banks have increased their 
reliance on Federal Reserve clearing balances and implemented 
more sophisticated information technologies (Clouse and 
Elmendorf 1997; Bennett and Hilton 1997). Banks “unbound” 
by reserve requirements are also less likely to be concerned with 
settlement day adjustments at the end of the maintenance 
period. Thus, the growing number of unbound banks may 
actually have helped diminish volatility in the federal funds 
market.
 Nevertheless, retail sweep programs are an inefficient and 
costly way to avoid reserve regulations. The proliferation of 
these programs therefore underscores the need for reform. One 
approach, currently in place in several industrialized countries, 
is the use of an operating procedure without explicit reserve 
requirements (see Borio [1997] and Woodford [2000]). The 
current focus in the United States, however, is more 
predisposed to modifying existing practices to alleviate the 
need to work around reserve requirements. As part of this 
initiative, Congress approved a bill in April 2001 that would 
authorize the Fed to pay interest on Federal Reserve account 
balances two years after the bill’s enactment.2 
In this paper, we offer new statistical evidence indicating 
that reserve requirements have declined significantly in 
effectiveness, in the sense that they no longer appear to be as 
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important a binding constraint on banks’ holdings of assets 
that qualify as reserves. After reviewing definitions and 
concepts, we look at the trends indicating that banks have been 
successful in operating with significantly lower amounts of 
non-interest-bearing reserve assets. We also show that the 
periodic effects in the federal funds market associated with 
reserve requirements appear to be greatly reduced. Moreover, 
partly because of the growth of automated teller machines 
(ATMs), more banks have been able to fulfill their 
requirements entirely with vault cash. We present an 
econometric analysis showing that vault cash holdings have 
become linked more significantly to market interest rates, a 
finding consistent with the theoretical prediction that banks 
would tighten cash inventory management techniques in the 
absence of binding reserve requirements.
II. Bank Reserves: A Review
Most banks’ marginal reserve requirements are 10 percent of 
demand and checking deposits.3 Banks can fulfill these 
requirements with vault cash and with balances in their Federal 
Reserve accounts.4 Neither of these asset categories, however, 
earns interest for the bank. A bank typically will use both of 
these assets to produce payments services, but otherwise the 
two types of assets are rather different and not close substitutes.
Vault Cash 
Vault cash includes currency held within the United States by 
depository institutions. Banks use this currency for a wide 
variety of purposes, such as:
• money kept in ATMs; 
• large cash deposits still being verified; 
• large withdrawal orders being prepared for delivery; 
• supplies of cash or coin stored by banks (or by their 
agents, such as armored carriers), for example, to meet 
customer requests; 
• cash in transit between branch offices. 
 In short, vault cash is an important input to banking 
because a key function of banks is to provide cash services to 
customers. The bank’s total vault cash is the sum of cash being 
processed or used in a variety of places and for a variety of 
purposes. Therefore, optimal inventory size is a rather complex 
notion. Factors such as the geographic dispersion of bank 
offices, the cost of protection, and the mix of cash-related 
services demanded by the bank’s customers are important 
determinants of how much vault cash a bank would need for 
business purposes, even in the absence of reserve requirements. 
In addition to a bank’s business uses for cash, the direct and 
opportunity costs of holding cash are also key determinants of 
optimal inventory size. One set of cost elements includes 
security and storage. A more important factor is the forgone 
return that a bank could have earned investing these funds in 
other ways, for example, at market interest rates. In principal, 
changes in market interest rates would imply corresponding 
shifts in the bank’s optimal inventory size in the absence of 
reserve requirements.
Other factors being equal, banks with reserve requirements 
in excess of their business demand for vault cash might be 
expected to hold more vault cash than they otherwise would. 
From an internal cost-benefit viewpoint, such banks would 
require a correspondingly lower business-related return from 
vault cash at the margin, since it would also help to fulfill the 
regulatory requirement. In addition to inducing banks to hold 
more vault cash than they otherwise would, reserve 
requirements reduce the sensitivity of these inventories to 
market interest rates. When a bank’s demand for vault cash is 
effectively decided by reserve requirements, rather than by 
inventory cost-benefit considerations, market interest rates 
become less directly relevant.5
Bank Balances in Federal Reserve Accounts
Similar logic applies to the balances that banks hold in their 
Federal Reserve accounts. Banks use these accounts to provide 
check clearing and electronic payments services, including the 
sending and receiving of funds over the Federal Reserve’s wire 
transfer system for the settlement of their customers’ 
commercial and financial transactions. Banks are required to 
avoid negative end-of-day balances in these accounts. Given 
the uncertain timing and size of customers’ payments, banks 
tend to leave themselves a margin of error. They do this by 
aiming for an end-of-day balance big enough to minimize their  
risk of being overdrawn. To manage the levels of these balances, 
banks purchase or sell funds in their own names in the federal 
funds market.
The Federal Reserve is not allowed to pay interest on these 
account balances. However, in order to create a competitive 
parallel to banks offering correspondent services, the Fed offers 
“clearing balance” arrangements. Although these are FRBNY Economic Policy Review / Forthcoming 3
Chart 1
Components of Reserve and Account 
Balances at the Fed
Monthly Averages











00 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 90 89 88 87 86 85 1984
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Applied vault cash
Required reserve balances 
contractual rather than regulatory obligations, the clearing 
balances function very similarly to required reserve balances. In 
particular, they must be met over the same two-week 
calculation period. A distinctive feature of these clearing 
balances is that they earn credits that can be used by a bank to 
pay for Federal Reserve bank services.6 The rate at which such 
credits accrue is tied to market interest rates. These credits have 
value only to the extent that the bank obtains priced services 
from the Fed, and this limits the amount of clearing balances to 
which a bank will commit. Beyond required reserve and 
clearing balances, other Fed account balances count as excess 
reserves and earn no interest or credits.
As with vault cash, the amount of balances a bank would 
keep in its Fed account is inversely related to market interest 
rates. A bank with little or no reserve balance requirement (for 
example, due to deposit sweeping or large vault cash holdings) 
would likely set up a clearing balance at the Fed. This would 
allow the bank to provide wire transfer capabilities to its 
customers and simultaneously earn credits to pay for check 
clearing and other Fed services. Because the service credit yield 
on banks’ clearing balances moves in step with market interest 
rates, one effect of higher rates, then, would be to reduce the 
level of balances to cover a bank’s service bill.7 This is one 
reason why a bank’s desired total Fed account balance may be 
lower when market rates are higher. In addition, bank 
customers’ demands for checking and demand deposit 
balances (subject to reserve requirements) are also sensitive to 
interest rates, affecting required reserves by implication. 
Finally, banks may take additional steps to reduce non-
interest-bearing excess reserve balances when market rates are 
higher. Conversely, if a bank’s reserve balance requirements are 
large relative to the amount it would hold in its Fed account for 
business reasons, then its incentive to adjust independently to 
market rate changes would be limited. 
A related point concerns the amount and timing of federal 
funds market activity by banks meeting their required reserve 
balances or clearing balances. Banks must meet their 
requirements with the average of end-of-day balance levels 
during the two-week reserve-calculation period. This would 
occasionally put particular pressure on a bank to buy or sell 
funds on the settlement Wednesday at the end of the 
calculation period, to dispose of excess balances or to cover 
balance requirements. This typically causes fed funds rates to 
be more volatile on such settlement days. In contrast, if banks 
were not subject to reserve or clearing balance requirements, 
they would still have to pay close attention to their daily 
positions, but the settlement Wednesdays would have less  
importance. (We return to this implication later.) Finally, it is 
also worth noting that, if a bank keeps its Fed account balance 
higher than it otherwise would because of reserve 
requirements, such a balance would likely “turn over” less than 
an unconstrained account would. If reserve requirements 
became less binding, the turnover, or payments velocity, would 
rise, which we also address.
III. Trends in Vault Cash and Federal 
Reserve Account Balances
It is helpful to gain some perspective from aggregate trends. 
Chart 1 plots the composition of bank reserves and Fed 
account components. The bottom part of the chart represents 
vault cash applied against reserve requirements, which was less 
than half of reserves in 1990 but has become by far the largest 
part. Vault cash growth was spurred by the need to service 
public demand, particularly the demand for ATMs. 
The other major reserve component in the chart, required 
reserve balances, has declined strikingly over the period. In 
1990 and 1992, reductions in reserve requirements caused 
temporary declines, but the implementation of sweep accounts 
after 1995 had the most sustained impact on required reserve 
balances.8 As Chart 2 indicates, the amount of deposits being 
swept through such programs has grown quite rapidly, and a 
gradually slowing trend is shown. We see in Chart 1 that the 4 Are U.S. Reserve Requirements Still Binding?
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rate of reduction in required reserve balances began to taper off 
after 1997, although since then, both applied vault cash and 
required reserve balances have continued to decline gradually. 
Anderson and Rasche (2001) recently developed a formal 
model for measuring the aggregate effect of deposit sweeps. 
Their study suggests that retail sweeps contributed to a 
$34 billion reduction in required reserves in December 1999.
Much of the reduction in reserve balances has been 
accompanied by an offsetting increase in clearing balances. 
Indeed, by mid-2000, aggregate required reserve balances had 
become smaller than clearing balances. This is consistent with 
the notion that reserve requirements were ceasing to bind, 
since clearing balance arrangements may fill in the difference 
between required reserve balances and the amounts banks 
prefer for operational purposes. Through these clearing 
balances, which yield an implicit return, banks have been able 
to avoid a large build-up in zero-earning excess reserve 
balances (Chart 3).
The importance of sweep accounts is illustrated in Chart 4, 
which plots the percentages of sweeping and nonsweeping 
banks bound in an accounting sense (that is, banks that have a 
positive reserve balance requirement). With the fraction of 
accounting-bound sweepers falling, now only 30 percent of 
banks have any reserve balance requirement applicable to their 
Fed accounts. For the other 70 percent, vault cash now satisfies 
all their reserve requirements, and their Fed accounts contain 
clearing balances and excess reserves. For these 70 percent, 
reserve requirements are not effective. The requirements may 
not be binding for some of the other 30 percent as well. 
However, due to limitations on the size of a bank’s clearing 
balances, many of the remaining 30 percent may hold required 
or excess reserve balances in order to meet operating needs.9 
The fact that required reserve balances have been declining 
as a proportion of banks’ Fed accounts is consistent with the 
idea that reserve requirements are ceasing to bind not only in 
the accounting sense but in the economic sense as well. Further 
support for this notion may be found in Chart 5, which plots 
the ratio of dollar payment volumes made through banks’ Fed 
accounts relative to their end-of-day average balances. A shift 
from a low ratio to a higher ratio would be consistent with 
reserve requirements ceasing to bind. Thus, the chart suggests 
that such a shift has been well under way. The fact that the 
turnover ratio plotted is still rising, however, implies that the 
transition to a new equilibrium—with banks holding Fed 
account balances strictly for business purposes—is not yet 
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Applied
Yet another piece of evidence that reserve requirements are 
ceasing to bind is the recent behavior of intraday federal funds 
rate volatility. As noted earlier, banks trying to meet reserve 
and clearing balance requirements, or to shed unexpectedly 
large excess reserve positions, create larger volatility in the 
federal funds market on the last day of the reserve-calculation 
period. As we see in Chart 6, in recent years, the federal funds 
rate volatility on so-called settlement Wednesdays has 
diminished significantly relative to the average on other, 
nonsettlement days. The solid line in Chart 6 is based on 
measuring volatility as the intraday range of the federal funds 
rate, while the dashed line is based on a more recently available 
measure: the standard deviation of intraday prices. Each 
measure equals the average ratio of settlement Wednesday 
volatility to volatility in the other business days of the 
corresponding two-week reserve-calculation periods.10 
Even in the total absence of reserve requirements, some rise 
in volatility at the end of the calculation period could be 
expected, due to banks transacting to meet their (contractual) 
clearing balance levels (which, as noted, now exceed required 
reserve balances). However, if Fed account balances earned 
cash interest in place of the clearing balance credits, the 
volatility ratios would likely converge to unity. Admittedly, a 
number of other factors may have also contributed to lowering 
the intra-maintenance-period volatility of the federal funds 
rate. Large banks in the past few years have made great strides 
in improving their reserve management by installing advanced 
information systems for tracking payment activities. Increased 
consolidation among large banking organizations has also 
reduced uncertainty in payment flows across banks. The 
Federal Reserve has also made a number of adjustments to 
operating procedures that may have helped bring more 
stability to the money markets. Some of these changes include 
a shift to lagged reserve accounting for reserves and more 
frequent open market operations. Nevertheless, the rapid 
decline in the Wednesday volatility measures in the late 1990s 
is consistent with our hypothesis that reserve requirements 
have increasingly become less binding. 
Chart 7 plots both applied vault cash (the vault cash used to 
meet reserve requirements, also shown in Chart 1) and total 
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sometimes referred to as “surplus” vault cash—the vault cash 
held in excess of individual banks’ reserve requirements. The 
chart illustrates how total vault cash growth has slowed 
conspicuously, while the amount applied against reserve 
requirements has begun falling. It also reveals that most of the 
Y2K spike in vault cash was surplus, and that after January 
2000, banks managed down these quantities rapidly. 
The fact that surplus vault cash remains comparatively high 
underlines banks’ increased incentives to implement inventory 
management methods to optimize their vault cash levels. 
Chart 8 divides the sample into banks that have implemented 
sweep accounts and others. In 1994-95, the sweepers had little 
or no surplus vault cash, but they have more now. Their 
incentive to manage this surplus therefore has grown. 
Incentives for nonsweepers, who have tended to have surplus 
vault cash all along, have changed less. Note that much more of 
the vault cash in absolute terms is in the hands of sweepers.11 
In short, the ability to sweep away reserve requirements has, 
on balance, given banks a greater incentive to implement ways 
to economize on vault cash inventories. We now investigate 
this phenomenon more closely.
IV. Are Banks More Sensitive to the 
Opportunity Cost of Holding 
Cash? Evidence from Regression 
Analysis 
We have argued that the incentives for managing vault cash 
have increased. These incentives, however, are not easily 
discernible from looking at the level of vault cash balances for 
sweeping and nonsweeping depository institutions. As seen in 
Charts 7 and 8, it is very hard to detect a significant downward 
trend in total cash holdings, albeit the growth in cash levels has 
decreased somewhat in the latter half of the 1990s. One 
drawback of this approach is that efforts to economize on vault 
cash may not actually be easy to see graphically. Similarly, it 
may be difficult to detect an increased sensitivity to interest 
rates in a chart. A more effective way to study changes in banks’ 
vault cash management may be to use an econometric model. 
In the absence of reserve requirements, the task of vault cash 
management by depository institutions can be viewed as a 
special case of the problem of optimizing the demand for 
money by any firm. A large literature has proposed analytical 
solutions to this class of operational business problems. 
Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) were the first to apply the 
concept of inventory modeling to cash balances. Subsequently, 
studies have applied such techniques in more complex versions 
of bank inventory optimization (see, for example, Orgler 
[1970]; for a more recent application of these models, see Allen 
[1998]). Theoretical or applied inventory models typically 
must start with a number of assumptions. For example, cash 
flows are frequently assumed to be stochastic, and the 
opportunity costs of holding and transferring cash balances are 
assumed to be positive. Even if depository institutions were not 
using formal optimization models, the logic in such models is 
sufficiently compelling for us to expect banks to be sensitive to 
similar variables.
We hypothesize that banks have become more focused on 
minimizing the costs of holding cash, whether they use 
sophisticated quantitative methods or rely on less formal, rule-
of-thumb techniques. We have argued that since sweep 
accounts and reserve requirement reductions were introduced 
in the 1990s, bank incentives have shifted accordingly. The 
rapid decline in computing costs and improvements in 
inventory tracking may have made it more practical for banks 
(and other businesses) to implement such inventory 
management techniques. Depository institutions not bound by 
reserve requirements should in theory manage vault cash and 
Fed account balances differently than institutions with binding 
requirements. Without effective reserve requirements, banks 
should hold smaller vault cash inventories, and these should be FRBNY Economic Policy Review / Forthcoming 7
more sensitive to movements in market interest rates and to 
fluctuations in the currency needs of customers. We test this 
premise by constructing an empirical model of the relationship 
between a bank’s vault cash balances and key determining 
variables. 12
Definition of Regression Variables
We estimate several alternative model specifications for vault 
cash. Initially, we investigate the relationship between the 
quarterly growth of vault cash and a set of key explanatory 
factors. For robustness, we also estimate the regression model 
using as the dependent variable the ratio of vault cash to total 
deposits. 
It is clear from our discussion in Section II that an empirical 
model for determining the growth or level of vault cash held by 
depository institutions should at least control for two key 
factors. First, we need to include in the regression model the 
opportunity costs of holding nonearning vault cash. A good 
measure of these costs is given by the federal funds rate, which 
represents the rate of return that banks can earn by lending 
cash assets overnight. Second, customer demand, which 
determines currency flows in and out of the bank, is a key factor 
influencing vault cash. A growing base of depositors also may 
increase a bank’s reserve requirement and a bank’s customer 
demand for cash services. A proxy for growth in the bank’s 
customer base is given by growth in transaction deposits.13
In addition to these two fundamental determinants, vault 
cash balances could also be influenced by a variety of other 
factors. A bank’s level of vault cash may exhibit certain intra-
weekly patterns, falling toward the end of a week as customers 
make withdrawals. More appropriate for our analysis, which is 
done at a quarterly frequency, is the notion that vault cash may 
have seasonal patterns. We control for seasonal variation by 
including quarterly dummy variables. The inventory of 
currency held by depository institutions also depends on the 
nature and structure of the institution. The servicing needs for 
a small-unit (one-branch) bank are clearly much different 
from those of a large regional or money center bank that could 
have branches dispersed across many states. In our regression 
analysis, we attempt to control for these differences in several 
ways. In the most basic way, we include as explanatory variables 
the size and Federal Reserve District location of the bank. 
When appropriate, the specification includes more elaborate 
measures of geographic diversification.
Data 
Our sample is a cross-sectional time-series panel of commercial 
banks between 1984 and 1999.14 Bank-level information on 
vault cash and other reserve items is available from the Federal 
Reserve System’s Report of Transaction Accounts, Other 
Deposits and Vault Cash (FR 2900). Table 1 presents selected 
summary statistics for the panel, which forms the basis of our 
data, combined with information from other bank databases, 
such as the Consolidated Report of Condition and Income for 
Banks and the Summary of Deposits.
In light of the huge wave of banking industry consolidation 
during our sample period, it is imperative that we account in 
our analysis for structural changes, such as mergers, as well as 
for failures.15 In particular, it is critical to eliminate jumps and 
discontinuities associated with mergers when the dependent 
variable is the growth in vault cash. We use two different 
approaches to ensure that our final results are robust. First, we 
estimate the total uncombined sample of banks, using dummy 
regressors to control for mergers, acquisitions, or failures. 
Second, the regression model is estimated again for the 
uncombined (non-pro-forma) sample of banks, but this time 
we exclude all quarterly observations in which the bank 
participated in a merger. In addition to these two reported 
methods, we analyze a pro-forma version of the sample, in 
which merger partners were combined retroactively in the 
sample. The pro-forma approach is particularly useful in pre- 
and post-merger comparisons but less relevant in the current 
context. For this reason, the pro-forma analysis is not reported 
in the current version of this paper. Overall, however, the 
results are very similar. 
Table 1
Selected Summary Statistics
Averages 1984 1990 1998
Total deposits (millions of dollars) 146 355 793
Demand deposits/total deposits
  (percent) 17.6 14.5 15.6
Vault cash/total deposits (percent) 1.27 0.93 0.94
Geographic dispersion 1,709 2,408 3,702
Number of banks 10,949 6,186 3,590
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Notes: Summary statistics are for all commercial banks reporting weekly 
in FR 2900. The geographic dispersion is measured as the total area of 
counties (in square miles) where a bank has an operating branch.8 Are U.S. Reserve Requirements Still Binding?
An added complication to our analysis was the Y2K 
precautionary buildup of bank vault cash (shown quite vividly 
in Chart 7). Rather than attempt to model this event, we 
conclude our sample at the end of 1998, prior to the beginning 
of the buildup.
Regression Findings
A simple way to investigate whether lower required reserves 
have influenced how banks manage vault cash is to estimate the 
regression model for banks that are bound in an accounting 
sense by reserve requirements. By definition, these banks have 
positive minimum reserve balance requirements to satisfy their 
existing Fed accounts. In contrast, an unbound bank would 
have no required reserve balance in its Fed account, instead 
holding only clearing balances or excess reserves. Accordingly, 
the unbound bank’s opportunity cost of holding vault cash 
would be more closely tied to market interest rates. However, a 
bound bank’s marginal opportunity cost of holding vault cash 
might very well be lower than market interest rates and 
relatively insensitive to market rate changes.16 In practice, 
many banks switch or alternate over time between being bound 
and unbound by these accounting definitions.
Table 2 presents the findings for banks reporting during the 
1994-98 period. The first section of the table presents the 
Table 2
Factors Influencing Vault Cash Reserves, 1994-98
Dependent Variable: Quarterly Growth in Vault Cash (Percent)
Excluding Quarter of Merger, Non-Pro-Forma Non-Pro-Forma
Explanatory Variables Mostly Bound Somewhat Bound Unbound Mostly Bound Somewhat Bound Unbound
Constant 9.175*** 16.318*** 15.220***  9.969*** 18.748*** 14.522***
(5.37) (6.744) (4.50) (5.52) (7.76) (4.28)
Second-quarter  dummy 4.692*** 3.817*** 5.072***  4.128*** 3.937*** 5.033*** 
(13.34) (10.48) (13.71) (11.36) (10.71) (13.57)
Third-quarter  dummy 2.283***  -0.030 -1.687***  1.934***  0.039 -1.715*** 
(6.85) (-0.09) (-4.81) (5.61) (0.11) (-4.87)
Fourth-quarter  dummy 2.963*** -1.385*** -3.404***  2.025*** -1.421*** -3.499*** 
(8.78) (-3.95) (-9.53) (5.81) (-4.04) (-9.78)
Change  in  sweeps -1.454*** -2.166*** -0.098  -1.367*** -2.181***  0.075 
(-5.42) (-4.55) (-0.13) (-4.76) (-4.61) (0.10)
Fed  funds  rate -1.020*** -1.718*** -1.792***  -1.355*** -1.796*** -1.811*** 
(-4.48) (-7.05) (-7.61) (5.74) (-7.31) (-7.67)
Demand  deposit  growth 0.281*** 0.566*** 0.634***  0.547*** 0.634*** 0.670*** 
(24.50) (31.68) (28.03) (59.37) (49.10) (34.61)
Number of acquisitions   3.292***  8.899***  6.238*** 
(13.99) (13.27) (3.82)
Log of size -0.226**  -0.359**  -0.187  -0.131  -0.546***  -0.114 
(-2.41) (-2.03) (-0.67) (-1.38) (-3.11) (-0.41)
Adjusted R2 0.035 0.045 0.054 0.160 0.139 0.089
Sample size 25,732 26,995 23,705 26,767 27,436 23,838
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Notes: The regression sample includes only commercial banks. Regressions also include dummy variables controlling for the Federal Reserve District location 
of the bank. The change in sweeps is +1 (sweep programs added), 0 (no change), -1 (sweep programs subtracted). The fed funds rate is the average rate over 
the previous quarter (percent). Demand deposit growth is the quarterly growth in demand deposits (percent). The number of acquisitions represents the 
number of takeovers in the quarter. The log of size is the logarithm of total deposits. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / Forthcoming 9
regression analysis on the uncombined sample of banks that 
excludes all quarterly bank observations with a merger. In 
contrast, the second section reports the findings of the 
regression model that controls for these structural shifts in 
vault cash by including in the regressors the number of 
acquisitions. The first two columns in each section list the 
regression coefficients for banks that were mostly bound 
(bound in an accounting sense in more than half of the reserve 
accounting periods) and somewhat bound (bound in at least 
one but in less than half of the reporting periods), respectively. 
The third column presents the regression estimates for banks 
that were never bound during this period.
These regressions support the premise that the amount of 
cash held by banks is influenced by the opportunity cost of 
these assets, as reflected in the negative and significant 
coefficient of the federal funds rate. For every percentage point 
increase in the federal funds rate, our estimates suggest that 
vault cash for unbound institutions would decrease on average 
roughly 1.8 percent in a quarter. Somewhat surprisingly, in the 
regressions covering the entire sample period, we find that both 
bound and unbound banks exhibit a negative and significant 
coefficient on the federal funds rate. However, the regression 
estimates reveal that at least there is an expected ordering in the 
effect of federal funds. Unbound banks have the highest 
sensitivity to interest rates. A simple F-test confirms that the 
coefficients of the federal funds for unbound and mostly bound 
banks are statistically different at the 5 percent level of 
significance.
One possible explanation for the negative interest rate 
coefficient on the two categories of bound banks as well as on 
the unbound banks might be the introduction of new 
technologies. As sweep accounts became available in the mid-
1990s, even bound banks might be motivated to manage vault 
cash more efficiently because they could foresee the possibility 
of becoming unbound in the future. In fact, the majority of 
institutions that introduced sweep programs after 1994 were 
bound. As Chart 4 illustrates, most of these banks have 
managed to become unbound by the end of the decade. Other 
banks—such as those that were already unbound—had this 
incentive all along. As new vault cash management methods 
became more available, however, such incentives would have 
spread even to unbound banks, pushing down their levels and 
inducing greater responsiveness to interest rate changes. 
The significant difference in the federal funds coefficients 
shows that unbound banks are more proactively managing 
cash flows. The interest rate coefficient controls for the implicit 
price effects in the reduced-form equation. These findings are 
further reinforced by the relationship between the growth in 
vault cash and the growth in demand deposits. The growth in 
demand deposits reflects the quantity effects by capturing shifts 
in vault cash resulting from variations in the bank’s customer 
base or changes in the demand for cash. As expected, the 
growth in demand deposits has a significant positive effect on 
the growth of cash for all three categories of banks, presumably 
reflecting banks’ response to the expanding needs of 
customers. Again, however, the sensitivity is strongest for 
unbound institutions. A 1 percent growth in demand deposits 
contributes to a 0.63 percent rise in vault cash for unbound 
banks but only a 0.28 percent rise for mostly bound banks. 
Unbound banks are more sensitive to the growth in demand 
deposits because they maintain lower excess cash holdings that 
must be replenished more readily to satisfy increased customer 
needs. 
The significant negative coefficient on the change in sweeps 
indicates the direct role of sweep accounts in lowering currency 
reserves. The effect of sweeps is especially strong for bound 
banks, signifying the critical contribution made by this 
technology in decreasing vault cash balances through lower 
reserve requirements. 
More light is shed if we separately estimate the model 
coefficients for subperiods. During the 1980s, banks faced fairly 
stringent reserve requirements and therefore were not as 
motivated to optimize currency reserves. During the 1990s, 
lower reserve requirements, the growth of vault cash in ATMs, 
and the availability of sweep programs encouraged banks to 
become progressively more proactive in their vault cash 
inventory management. 
Table 3 presents estimates of the vault cash model for three 
subperiods: 1984-89, 1990-93, and 1994-98. The earlier period 
is identified with fairly restrictive reserve requirements. During 
the latter two periods, many banks were able to reduce required 
reserve holdings. Looking at the regression coefficients given in 
the table, we find again that the relationship between the 
growth of vault cash and its opportunity cost is negative 
between 1994 and 1998. In contrast, vault cash exhibits a 
positive and significant relationship with the federal funds rate 
before 1990. A positive coefficient would suggest a passive vault 
cash policy by banks, such as accepting larger inventories when 
high interest rates led customers to economize on their own 
cash holdings. The smaller positive coefficient on the federal 
funds rate in the intermediate period between 1990 and 1993 is 
consistent with the notion that lower effective reserve ratios 
may have encouraged banks to pay closer attention to limiting 
vault cash holdings and excess reserves. 
Perhaps more revealing than the changing reaction to the 
implicit price of holding currency, the regression findings in 
Table 3 demonstrate a statistically significant shift in the 
quantity relationship between the growth in vault cash and the 
growth in demand deposits. Comparing the positive 10 Are U.S. Reserve Requirements Still Binding?
coefficients on demand deposit growth across the three 
subperiods, we observe a large jump in 1994-98. This increase 
again suggests that cash balances during 1990-94 were more 
tightly linked to changing customer demands. In the earlier 
periods, stringent reserve requirements may have compelled 
banks to hold an otherwise unnecessary amount of currency 
passively because it would satisfy these rules. Cash on hand was 
more than enough to accommodate demand fluctuations and 
secular growth. By contrast, Table 2 illustrates that after 1994, 
fewer bound banks appear to manage cash reserves more 
efficiently, keeping the vault cash levels more tightly managed 
to levels appropriate for meeting customer demands, subject to 
the need to respond to interest rate movements. 
For robustness, we attempt a specification where the 
dependent variable is the ratio of vault cash to total deposits, 
and we obtain similar results (Table 4). In contrast to the 
growth rate of vault cash, this measure is noisier in that there is 
more unexplained cross-sectional variation in the two 
components of the ratio. Although this cash-to-assets ratio is a 
less effective measure, it does offer a simple way to examine the 
Table 3
Factors Influencing Vault Cash Reserves across Different Periods
Dependent Variable: Quarterly Growth in Vault Cash (Percent)
Excluding Quarter of Merger, Non-Pro-Forma Non-Pro-Forma
Explanatory Variables 1994-98 1984-89 1990-93 1994-98 1984-89 1990-93
Constant 12.703*** -1.634** 11.541*** 13.275*** -1.104 13.116*** 
(11.26) (-2.18) (12.75) (11.74) (-1.46) (14.36)
Second-quarter dummy 4.503*** 8.393*** -3.825*** 4.325*** 7.787*** -4.178*** 
(21.47) (53.99) (-19.51) (20.33) (49.58) (-20.91)
Third-quarter dummy 0.257 2.148*** -3.233*** 0.157 1.750*** -3.472***
(1.29) (14.01) (-16.48) (0.78) (11.28) (-17.36)
Fourth-quarter dummy -0.479** 4.020*** -11.884*** -0.848*** 3.487*** -12.487**
 (-2.38) (25.34) (-59.26) (-4.15) (21.76) (-61.16)
Change in sweeps -1.726*** -1.573*** 
(-7.36) (-6.78)
Fed funds rate -1.430*** 0.261*** 0.133*** -1.608*** 0.250*** 0.170*** 
(-10.46) (7.27) (4.09) (-11.60) (6.87) (5.12)
Growth in demand deposits 0.416*** 0.138*** 0.232*** 0.609*** 0.188*** 0.286*** 
(46.31) (45.50) (57.88) (89.55) (63.94) (73.88)
Number of acquisitions 3.744*** 11.878*** 13.722*** 
 (17.25) (45.21) (43.65)
Merger/failure dummy 0.231 -0.292*** -0.714*** 0.496*** -0.218** -0.435***
(1.41) (-2.73)  (-5.12) (2.98) (-2.02) (-3.06)
Log of size -0.229*** -0.064 -0.312*** -0.222** -0.084 -0.457*** 
(-3.25) (-1.18) (-4.42) (-3.21) (-1.52) (-6.44)
Adjusted R2 0.039 0.036 0.063 0.128 0.059 0.109
Sample size 76,434 187,601 90,943 78,043 189,525 92,784
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Notes: The regression sample includes only commercial banks. Regressions also include dummy variables controlling for the Federal Reserve District location 
of the bank. The change in sweeps is +1 (sweep programs added), 0 (no change), -1 (sweep programs subtracted). The fed funds rate is the average rate over 
the previous quarter (percent). The growth in demand deposits is from the previous quarter (percent). The number of acquisitions represents the number of 
takeovers in the quarter. The merger/failure dummy is 1 if the bank was acquired or failed during the period. The log of size is the logarithm of total deposits. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / Forthcoming 11
determinants of the stock of vault cash holdings. Additional 
explanatory variables help control for systematic differences in 
the relative stock of cash held by banks. For example, banks 
with a greater geographic span may have to hold more currency 
inventories due to the high cost of moving cash inventories 
between offices. In Table 4, we again find strong evidence that 
banks are more sensitive to the economic costs of holding cash 
in the 1994-98 period. A 1 percent decline in the federal funds 
Table 4
Factors Influencing Vault Cash Reserves across Different Periods 
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Vault Cash to Total Deposits (Percent)
Excluding Quarter of Merger, Non-Pro-Forma Non-Pro-Forma
Explanatory Variables 1994-98 1984-89 1990-93 1994-98 1984-89 1990-93
Constant -0.150*** 0.591*** -0.098*** -0.181*** 0.576*** -0.114*** 
(-3.63) (34.82) (-4.43) (-4.52) (34.41) (-5.27)
Second-quarter dummy 0.028*** 0.055*** 0.033*** 0.028*** 0.054*** 0.032***
(4.17) (16.47) (6.65) (4.31) (16.45) (6.68)
Third-quarter dummy 0.024*** 0.038*** 0.048*** 0.026*** 0.038*** 0.048***
(3.83) (11.43) (10.02) (4.08) (11.52) (9.99)
Fourth-quarter dummy -0.001 0.028*** -0.021*** 0.005 0.029*** -0.021*** 
(-0.09) (8.34) (-4.31) (0.08) (8.50) (-4.45)
Dummy for sweeps -0.016* -0.022** 
(-1.77) (2.48)
Fed funds rate -0.011** 0.025*** 0.003*** -0.011** 0.025*** 0.003*** 
(-2.21) (32.08) (3.78) (-2.37) (32.13) (3.71)
Ratio of demand deposits 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.011*** 0.020*** 0.018*** 0.011***
(61.85) (115.2) (52.27) (62.88) (115.82) (53.30)
Number of acquisitions -0.005 0.027*** 0.005 
(-0.84)  (5.12) (0.91)
Merger/failure dummy 0.023*** 0.055*** 0.011*** 0.024*** 0.055*** 0.011***
(4.09) (22.69) (3.23) (4.41) (22.74) (3.32)
Geographic dispersion 0.124*** 0.123*** 
(45.81) (46.22)
Number of BHC subsidiaries 0.002*** -0.0001* 0.00006 0.002*** -0.0001** 0.00003 
(9.45) (-1.79) (0.46) (9.48) (-1.96) (0.24)
Log of size -0.025*** -0.028*** 0.055*** -0.021*** -0.026*** 0.056***
(-8.82) (-22.52) (32.28) (-7.78) (-21.62) (33.93)
Adjusted R2 0.125 0.158 0.112 0.105 0.136 0.114
Sample size 70,761 186,069 79,109 72,399 189,525 80,776
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Notes: The regression sample includes only commercial banks. Regressions also include dummy variables controlling for the Federal Reserve District location 
of the bank.  The dummy for sweeps is 1 if the bank initiated a sweep program, 0 otherwise. The fed funds rate is the average rate over the previous quarter 
(percent). The ratio of demand deposits is demand deposits divided by total deposits (percent). The number of acquisitions represents the number of 
takeovers in the quarter. The merger/failure dummy is 1 if the bank was acquired or failed during the period. The geographic dispersion is measured as the 
total area of counties (in square miles) where a bank has an operating branch. The number of bank holding company (BHC) subsidiaries represents all 
commercial banks operating under the same BHC umbrella. The log of size is the logarithm of total deposits.
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.12 Are U.S. Reserve Requirements Still Binding?
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rate raises the ratio of currency to total deposits by about 
1.5 basis points. Considering that this ratio does not vary much 
over time, such an impact of opportunity costs appears 
economically significant.17 Again, the ratio of vault cash is also 
more responsive to demand deposits (as a percentage of total 
deposits) during the late 1990s compared with the earlier 
periods. As we have hypothesized, the Table 4 results show that 
the ratio of vault cash to total deposits is also influenced by 
geographic dispersion, measured as the logarithm of the total 
area of all counties where the bank has at least one branch. 
Banks with larger branch networks therefore appear to hold a 
higher share of vault cash reserves.18
The Influence of ATMs
An important structural factor that was left unexplored in the 
analysis thus far is the surge in automated teller machines. 
During the 1990s, the number of ATMs used by banks grew 
from 80,000 to 239,000 (Chart 9). ATMs account for many of 
the cash transactions at banks. In fact, most ATM bank 
networks are now connected to national or regional networks 
that allow easier and almost continuous access to funds. 
Not only are ATMs more cost effective in dispensing cash, 
but they have also introduced new wrinkles to vault cash 
management. Today, the term “vault cash” might seem like a 
misnomer because a significant fraction of cash inventories 
may be physically located in ATMs twenty-four hours a day 
instead of in bank vaults. The rapid growth in ATM networks 
has surely altered the way in which banks manage their cash 
inventories. The difficulty with examining the relationship 
between the growth of ATMs and cash reserves is a practical 
one: little or no data are collected on the amount of cash that 
banks hold in their ATMs.19
To examine the impact of ATMs, we collected data from 
various issues of the Card Industry Directory, published by 
Faulkner and Gray. These annual directories provide 
information on the 300 largest ATM owners in the United 
States and Canada. In addition to bank-by-bank information, 
the Card Industry Directory provides useful aggregate 
summaries on ATMs, such as the number of transactions per 
ATM shown in Chart 9. Because some of the information is 
summarized at the bank holding company level, we were not 
able to fully match all 300 institutions to our bank sample. 
After we eliminated all noncommercial banking institutions 
(mostly credit unions and thrifts) and dropped Canadian 
banks, the final sample consisted of an unbalanced panel of 
128 commercial banks. 
In addition to being an unbalanced sample, the ATM 
database is also more fragmented than the much larger Federal 
Reserve database on bank reserves. For one, banks may now 
drop in and out of the sample because the top 300 rankings 
change every year. Therefore, it is almost impossible to 
estimate a regression model for quarterly changes in vault cash. 
For the most part, the sample of ATM banks is made up of large 
commercial banks that initiated sweep account programs 
during the 1990s. 
In Table 5, we look again at the relationship between the 
ratio of vault cash (as a percentage of total deposits) and its 
determinants. We find that the behavior of large ATM owners 
is fairly consistent with the full sample of commercial banks 
examined by the previous regressions. The ratio of vault cash 
balances is again positively related to the ratio of demand 
deposits, although the coefficient is very similar across the two 
subperiods. One minor difference is that the federal funds 
coefficient is now insignificant in 1994-98, although it was 
positive and significant in 1990-93 and it shifted in the 
expected direction after 1994. In a way, these findings are not 
surprising because the ATM sample is made up of large bound 
commercial banks and includes very few unbound institutions. 
Recall that these smaller unbound banks were mostly 
responsible for the negative relationship between the federal 
funds rate and vault cash and, more important, for the strong 
positive relationship between customer growth and cash 
holdings.
The ATM regressions again reveal that banks with sweep 
accounts held a lower ratio of cash balances. An important new 
finding, however, is that the number of ATMs is positively 
related to the cash ratio. Banks with more ATMs had a higher 
cash inventory. This result appears to support the premise that, 
at least initially, the rapid growth in ATMs during the 1990s has 
contributed in part to the rising vault cash levels. Finally, our FRBNY Economic Policy Review / Forthcoming 13
findings suggest that during 1990-93, cash balances were also 
influenced by how extensively the ATMs were used, measured 
in the regression model by the log of transactions per ATM. 
Banks owning more extensively used ATMs were required to 
hold more cash reserves. This effect, however, is pretty much 
negligible in 1994-98, perhaps because the ATMs were used less 
extensively during this period.
In short, it is unsurprising that banks with wider ATM 
networks have more vault cash. Given the potential for 
specialization in such an area, one might expect certain banks 
to become industry leaders in efficient vault cash management 
techniques, with corresponding reductions in vault cash 
inventories for other institutions. Moreover, in the absence of 
the low marginal cost of holding vault cash induced by reserve 
requirements, the field is opened up to more competition from 
nonbank providers, not only for servicing but also possibly for 
owning the vault cash associated with the ATMs. The effective 
cost of providing ATM transaction services may be higher in 
the sense that the true opportunity cost of the cash will be 
market interest rates, a development that may have affected 
ATM transaction charges as well.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented evidence that reserve 
requirements are rapidly losing relevance. Although a sizable 
minority of banks are still bound by reserve requirements in an 
accounting sense, in an economic sense our evidence suggests 
that such requirements have had a lessening effect on banks for 
at least several years. Indeed, most reserve requirements are 
now fulfilled by vault cash, and by the latter part of the 1990s, 
banks seemed to be managing this cash more in accordance 
with inventory optimization methods, as opposed to 
complying with a quantitative regulatory minimum. It is true 
that the growth of clearing balance arrangements between 
banks and the Federal Reserve has prolonged the paradigm of 
the reserve holding period, but such arrangements are likely to 
be intrinsically limited by their links to Federal Reserve service 
prices, quantities, and competitiveness. 
In several foreign economies, the role of reserve 
requirements has been reassessed or changed in recent years as 
the understanding of monetary policy transmission 
mechanisms has changed. As U.S. banks hone their abilities to 
manage vault cash and Federal Reserve account balances in a 
manner consistent with competitive returns on assets, it may be 
more sensible to move from quantity-based reserve 
requirements to more explicit, pricing-based approaches to 
managing these account balances.
Table 5
Factors Influencing Vault Cash for Banks with Large 
ATM Networks (Non-Pro-Forma Comparison)
Dependent Variable: Ratio of Vault Cash to Total Deposits 
(Percent)
Period
Explanatory Variables 1994-98 1990-93 1990-98
Constant 1.661*** -0.071 1.028*** 
(3.73) (-0.17) (3.71)
Second-quarter dummy 0.023 0.001 0.008 
(0.35) (0.03) (0.24)
Third-quarter dummy 0.057 0.044 0.053 
(1.01) (1.05) (1.56)
Fourth-quarter dummy 0.103 0.004 0.049 
(1.73) (0.10) (1.43)
Dummy for sweeps -0.113** -0.089*** 
(-2.06) (-2.60)
Fed funds rate 0.012 0.023*** 0.024*** 
(0.37) (3.06) (3.22)
Demand deposit ratio 0.022*** 0.029*** 0.027***
(10.66) (19.50) (22.18)
Number of acquisitions 0.056 0.004 0.020 
(1.20) (0.20) (0.73)
Log number ATMs 0.275*** 0.252*** 0.267*** 
(11.67) (11.16) (16.63)
Log of transactions/ATM 0.002 0.123*** 0.043* 
(0.48) (3.33) (1.74)
Geographic dispersion 0.102*** 0.103*** 0.107*** 
(5.08) (6.61) (8.67)
Log of size -0.218*** -0.172*** -0.210*** 
(-7.83) (-7.05) (-11.68)
Adjusted R2 0.468 0.507 0.484
Sample size 712 988 1,700
Sources: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System; Card 
Industry Directory.
Notes: The sample is an unbalanced panel consisting of 128 commercial 
banks with large ATM networks. Regressions also include dummy 
variables controlling for the Federal Reserve District location of the 
bank. The dummy for sweeps is 1 if the bank initiated a sweep program, 
0 otherwise. The fed funds rate is the average rate over the previous 
quarter (percent). The demand deposit ratio is demand deposits divided 
by total deposits (percent). The number of acquisitions represents the 
number of takeovers in the quarter. The geographic dispersion is 
measured as the total area of counties (in square miles) where a bank has 
an operating branch. The log of size is the logarithm of total deposits. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.Endnotes
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1. Banks able to avoid holding additional nonearning assets must 
nonetheless bear associated reporting and other compliance costs, as 
well as costs of implementing and maintaining the sweep technology. 
In addition, there is a social cost of administration and enforcement of 
reserve requirements.
2. The Small Business Interest Checking Act of 2001 (H.R. 974) 
includes several other proposals (for a more detailed discussion, see 
Meyer [2001]). The bill would authorize banks to pay interest on 
demand deposits under the same time framework. It would also give 
the Federal Reserve increased flexibility in setting reserve 
requirements. Finally, as an interim measure for the first two years, the 
bill would increase the number of allowable interaccount sweeps from 
the current six per month to twenty-four per month. 
3. In 1992, the required reserve ratio on checking accounts and 
business demand deposits was dropped from 12 to 10 percent, and 
allowances for “carrying over” balances from one accounting period 
to the next were liberalized. Prior to 1990, there were also reserve 
requirements on large time deposits and on net eurodollar funding of 
U.S. assets. As of December 30, 1999 (and subject to subsequent 
annual adjustments), reserve ratio requirements equaled only 
3 percent on transaction accounts between $5 million and 
$44.3 million and 10 percent for any amount exceeding that range. 
See, for example, Federal Reserve Bulletin, Table 1.15 (various issues).
4. Reserve requirements are based on deposits lagged by four weeks 
(two computational periods). Vault cash from this computational 
period is applied against those requirements. If the requirement is less 
than the vault cash, then no reserve balance requirement exists for the 
bank to hold in its Federal Reserve account. Otherwise, the 
requirement must be met as an average account balance during the 
two-week reserve-calculation period. In addition, excess reserves 
equal to as much as 4 percent (2 percent until 1992) of a bank’s reserve 
requirement may be “carried over” from one period to the next. 
However, vault cash in excess of the requirement (“surplus” vault 
cash) is not categorized as excess reserves and cannot be carried over 
to cover a subsequent period’s reserve requirement.
5. Indirectly, however, banks subject to reserve requirements will be 
affected by how their customers react to interest rate movements. For 
example, a large nonbank cash user may manage cash more tightly 
when interest rates rise, at least temporarily pushing more cash into its 
bank’s vault.
6.  In these arrangements, the bank earns credits that may be used to 
pay for Fed charges for check clearing, securities transfer, or other 
priced services. These credits are computed based on the level of 
market interest rates. For more information on required reserve 
balances and required clearing balance arrangements, see Meulendyke 
(1998).
7. In addition, higher interest rates lead to a rising basis-point gap 
between the crediting formula and actual market rates. This also 
motivates the bank to economize on the amount of balances to which 
it will commit.
8. Typically, banks can employ one or more sweep programs at the 
same time. One type of sweep program moves transaction deposit 
balances into savings deposits over the weekend (typically at the close 
of Friday) and returns the funds to the transaction accounts on 
Monday. Alternatively, banks may sweep a portion of a depositor’s 
transaction account balance over a predetermined threshold into a 
nonreservable savings account and return funds to the reservable 
account as needed.
9. A bank with some required reserve balances might not be affected 
by reserve requirements in the sense that it would have held that 
amount of funds anyway. The sum of such banks and the banks with 
surplus vault cash would equal the true total of banks not bound by 
reserve requirements, but only the banks with surplus vault cash can 
be identified using accounting data.
10. For a discussion of the effects of sweep accounts and changes in 
reserve requirements on federal funds rate volatility on nonsettlement 
days, see Bennett and Hilton (1997).
11. For further analysis of the effect of sweep accounts on reserve 
balances and vault cash, see Mattey and Krainer (2000).
12. There is a small literature examining vault cash management by 
banks. Allen (1998) uses an (S,s) inventory model to calibrate the 
behavior of banks. According to the theoretical inventory model, his 
study finds that banks have kept very high levels of reserves that 
cannot be justified by any reasonable variance and penalty 
assumptions of the model. Allen and Naples (1997) investigate a 
unique episode in reserve management. During a two-week period in 
October 1992, all vault cash holdings were ineligible to be counted 
toward meeting reserve requirements. As expected, banks responded 
by lowering cash holdings for this period.
13. Transaction deposit accounts perhaps are not the best proxy for 
measuring the growth in vault cash usage and the increase in the 
customer base. Variables such as the total number of accounts or Endnotes (Continued)
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customers might be somewhat more accurate in capturing changes in 
customer-driven demand for vault cash. Unfortunately, our database 
includes only information on the primary deposit components. We 
have also estimated the regression model using alternative measures of 
transaction accounts, such as the growth in net transaction deposits 
and the growth in total deposits. Overall, the regression estimates 
from these alternative explanatory variables were very similar. 
14. The panel is “unbalanced” in the sense that not every institution is 
observed in every year. Our study excludes credit unions, savings and 
loans, savings banks, and very small commercial banks that are 
required to report only quarterly. 
15. A list of mergers and failures was obtained from the National 
Information Center.
16. As noted earlier, a bank that holds required reserve balances in its 
Fed account—“bound” in an accounting sense—might not be bound 
at all in an economic sense.
17. Historically, the ratio of vault cash to total deposits has varied 
between 0.95 and 1.15 percent. As is evident from the regression 
estimates, much of the variation is explained by seasonal factors. 
18. Unfortunately, we were not able to control for geographic 
dispersion for the two earlier periods of the regression because of data 
limitations. Overall, the regression estimates for 1994-98 were quite 
similar with or without the geographic dispersion control. As a result, 
we decided to include dispersion because of its strong statistical 
significance. 
19. In addition to the cash actually in their ATMs, banks must also 
hold other vault cash inventories of work in process associated with 
ATM deposits and refills.References
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